Power ideas and conflict: ideology, linkage and leverage in Crimea and Chechnya by Hughes, James & Sasse, Gwendolyn
 1 
Power Ideas and Conflict: 
  
Ideology, Linkage and Leverage in Crimea and Chechnya 
 
 
James Hughes, London School of Economics 
And  
Gwendolyn Sasse, Nuffield College, University of Oxford 
 
 
 
 
 
The concepts of linkage and leverage address mechanisms by which international and 
domestic politics intersect and interact. Levitsky and Way have used these concepts to 
account for the dynamics of regime change, explaining why some regimes 
democratize and others do not, but the causal dynamics that turn different sets of 
linkages into leverage are underspecified in their account. In fact, they originally 
conceived of linkage and leverage as alternative modes of interaction (2006). The 
linkages covered in their discussion are limited to tangible quantifiable structural 
factors, ranging from economic and aid linkages to people-to-people contacts and 
communication. In this article, we not only extend the concept of linkages and 
leverage to the realm of conflict studies, we also add an important linkage – ideas 
about political power which we call power ideas – and we expand on the causal 
mechanisms that turn linkages into leverage in a conflict situation.  
Nations, regions or groups are characterized by a multitude of linkages. We 
argue that the existence of linkages per se does not explain the outbreak of conflict or 
its prevention, or its dynamics. Linkages need to be politically empowered by a 
process of mobilization which taps into popular and elite-level concerns. Ideological 
narratives figure prominently in this process of mobilization, and where ideas 
themselves are one of the prominent linkages between nations, regions or groups, the 
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scope for mobilization is enhanced. The exact extent to which anyone believes in the 
mobilized idea is ultimately less significant than the power of the idea to mobilize 
elites and masses and escalate or defuse conflict.  
  
We argue that the roles of ideas and ideology as international linkages are an 
important underestimated aspect of the debates on linkage and leverage in 
international politics. Power ideas, as defined above, are an essential component part 
of ideology. Ideology and collective identities, as much as material interests, shape 
elite and mass actions and allegiances. Ideologies are inherently about group identities 
in that they are culturally embedded “symbol-systems” for the ordering and filtering 
of social and historical time (Geertz 1964). Ideology provides the framework in which 
political positioning occurs, agendas are set, and decisions are taken and translated 
into action. It is used to then justify the exercise of power and policy. Elites, 
governments, and groups, gain normative coherence and traction for legitimating or 
de-legitimating policy and actions through ideology. Equally, we need to take account 
of the obscurantist function of ideology. For while its purpose is to decode and order 
perceptions, it does so by recoding meanings, structures, events, processes, aims and 
so on, often metaphorically, and embedding these in political identities, and 
ultimately using these to account for policy. These features and functions of ideology 
are widely accepted in the social sciences. Of themselves, ideas and ideology are hard 
to gauge systematically, but at critical junctures during a conflict the strength and 
causal force of these factors and the ways in which they can be politically mobilized 
become apparent. We cannot read or navigate conflict dynamics without 
understanding the role of ideologies.  
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Clearly not all ideas or ideologies have the potential to significantly shape or reshape 
domestic or international politics, but some ideas have the power to do both. These 
are the ideas we call power ideas. Since the fall of communism we have experienced 
a twenty-five year crisis in international relations over the management of conflicts 
emanating from two of the most significant power ideas that have shaped that crisis: 
nationalism, and Islamism. These two ideas are at the heart of our analysis. Ideas such 
as nationalism or Islamism represent a linkage that can be activated to reinforce other 
linkages, and ultimately turning them into leverage. Fundamentally, these power ideas 
are the antithesis of each other. Nationalism is an essentially secular organizing 
principle for the state domestically, and for the order of international relations. While 
there are competing interpretations between the modernist, constructivist analyses of 
nationalism and state-building, and more ethnically determined visions, secularism is 
one of the key defining features of nationalism (while accepting that some 
nationalisms may be fused with religious identities). Islamism, in contrast, is a 
rejection of secular and national territoriality and all such rooted forms of state-
building, and aspires to the creation of a theocratic transnational dominion.  We 
examine the impact of the power ideas of nationalism and Islamism in the cases of 
two major conflicts in the region: Crimea and Chechnya. Rather than directly 
comparing the two cases with their distinctive features, the aim here is to expand from 
the local to the international to understand in each case the role of international 
linkages, including power ideas, shaping different stages of conflict and the causal 
mechanisms that transform linkages into leverage.  
 
The nationalism power idea rose to a hegemonic level in Europe and Eurasia as a 
major factor in the collapse of communism (Beissinger 2002). The break-up of the 
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Soviet Union turned Crimea into an international case for Russia, whereas Chechnya 
was a conflict within the territorial boundaries of the Russian Federation, and 
therefore seen as a domestic matter. But such distinctions were far from being clear-
cut in the 1990s, when Russian nationalism exerted a tremendous force in Russian 
domestic politics, and where the Russian elites’ conception of what constituted the 
boundaries of a Russian homeland and what was “foreign” were fuzzy. For many 
Russians Crimea was part of a historical Russian homeland that had only recently and 
unjustifiably been removed from Russian jurisdiction in 1954 under Khrushchev and 
placed within the then Ukrainian SSR. Many Russians struggled to come to terms 
with the fact that the international order treated the collapse of the USSR as an end of 
empire and quasi-decolonization where the principle of uti posseditis juris meant that 
Soviet era administrative boundaries became the internationally recognised frontiers 
of new states. In the case of Crimea, however, where there was a Russian nationalist 
mobilization for independence in the early 1990s, that power idea was successfully 
managed in an interaction between Moscow, Kyiv and Crimean elites (with support of 
the OSCE), culminating in the creation of a Crimean autonomy within the otherwise 
unitary Ukrainian state. That arrangement was in part facilitated by a Russian foreign 
policy under then President Boris Yeltsin that was sensitive to regional and wider 
international ideas and pressures about what constituted rule-oriented “good 
behaviour” in accepting how the collapse of the USSR was to be managed. There was 
also a strategic security factor at work, as Yeltsin was prepared to sacrifice Russian 
nationalist ideology on Crimea in return for an agreement with Ukraine which 
guaranteed a vital strategic security interest - the continued use by Russia of the 
Crimean bases for its Black Sea Fleet.   
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The ideational linkage at work here was not only the triadic one between 
Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea, but was also shaped by a powerful pull on the Yeltsin 
administration for it to be integrated into Western international fora and norms. 
Moreover, Russia in the 1990s lacked significant leverage in any foreign policy issue 
that the Western Powers perceived to involve their “vital” interests. As its political 
clout was debilitated, its economy was broken, and its military was in disarray, the 
only leverage Russia could apply internationally was through working multilaterally. 
To a great extent that meant accepting a reduced status in international affairs, and 
subordinating itself to a Western alliance dominated by the USA on many key foreign 
policy issues, The puzzle here is what changed in the period between the negotiations 
over Crimean autonomy as a means of conflict-prevention in the 1990s and the 
annexation of Crimea by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2014? What had 
changed in the balance between constraints and enabling conditions shaping Russia’s 
perceptions of its international status and interests, and the willingness to mobilize the 
power idea of nationalism, whether in Russia, Crimea or Ukraine? 
 
In Chechnya the power idea of nationalism also took hold in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, A radical secular Chechen elite aspired to national self-determination 
along the lines of the “return to Europe” in Central and Eastern Europe. Chechnya, 
like Crimea, was a ‘victim’ of the uti posseditis principle applied internationally to 
manage the break-up of the USSR. In theory, the norm held that there was to be no 
secession from secession, though Western powers later broke with this norm over 
Kosovo in 2007 (Hughes 2013). In contrast to the stance on Crimea, Russia under 
Yeltsin was reluctant to negotiate with Chechen nationalism by offers of autonomy, 
and Chechen nationalists led by Dzhokhar Dudaev recalcitrantly adhered to an 
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absolutist position on self-determination. Consequently there followed a decade or 
more of bloody conflict. The puzzle here is less with understanding how the power 
idea of nationalism took hold in Chechnya in the late 1980s, but why that power idea 
was largely displaced by the power idea of Islamism by the late 1990s and with what 
consequences for the conflict domestically and internationally. Chechnya became a 
conflict motif for the surge in Islamism under Al Qaeda from the late 1990s. The 
power idea of Islamism was also adopted by Russia from 2000, at least nominally, as 
a way to coopt local loyalist elites and use them as proxies to manage the conflict and 
reduce the violence to a residual level compared to the latter 1990s. 
 
Here, following the questions set out in the introduction to this special issue, 
we trace the role of international linkages in the evolution of conflict in Crimea and 
Chechnya respectively, before drawing within-case and cross-case conclusions about 
the causal role of ideas and ideologies as linkages affecting conflict dynamics and 
outcomes.  
 
The Case of Crimea: From Accommodation to Annexation 
The sudden annexation of Crimea by Russia in March 2014 was a shock to 
international politics. Ukraine’s territorial integrity was made null and void despite 
the international guarantees provided by Russia, the US and the UK in the Budapest 
Memorandum of December 1994. Russia shattered a Western perception that a rule 
oriented new system of international norms had been established after the end of the 
Cold War (Burke-White 2014). Russia completed the whole process within a matter 
of days, including occupation by its military forces, breaking the political links 
between Crimea and Kyiv, holding a regional referendum, and formalizing the status 
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of the region and the city of Sevastopol as subjects of the Russian Federation (Allison 
2014; Sakwa 2015, 100-120). How do the concepts of linkage and leverage help us 
understand these developments that contrast sharply with the negotiations and 
moderation behind conflict prevention in the 1990s?  
 
From the fall of the USSR in 1991 to 2014 Crimea was analyzed as a rare 
example of "non-conflict" among the cluster of potential and actual post-Soviet 
territorial conflicts and a critical case in the wider comparative study of conflict 
(Sasse 2007). The potential for conflict in Crimea in the 1990s revolved around 
several regional, national and international dimensions: its unclear status within the 
newly independent Ukrainian vis-à-vis Kyiv; its post-Soviet relations with the former 
imperial centre Moscow, in particular the uncertainty over the naval bases in 
Sevastopol; the tension between the cultural and political domination of the ethnic 
Russian(-speaking) majority of the region and the Crimean Tatars returning to the 
peninsula from the places of their deportation. Even in Western perception and media 
discourse the likelihood of a violent conflict loomed large (The Economist 17 July 
1993; The Guardian 15 May 1994). 
 
The Russian nationalist narrative projects the continuity of a “Russian 
Crimea” from the age of Catherine the Great to the present, while ignoring Crimea’s 
centuries as an independent Crimean Tatar Khanate and as a part of the Ottoman 
Empire prior to the region’s incorporation into the Russian empire. The deportation of 
the Crimean Tatars under Stalin in 1944 remains outside the mainstream Russian 
imagination of Crimea, and the transfer of Crimea to the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian 
SSR under Khrushchev in 1954 is not accepted as a legal basis for Crimea’s post-
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Soviet belonging to independent Ukraine (for more details on the transfer of 1954, 
based on archival sources, see Sasse 2007, Chapter 5; on the Crimean Tatars see 
Williams 2001; Uehling 2004). Crimea as a setting for repeated large-scale national 
defeat has been reappropriated into a Russian narrative about ‘national glory’ and 
resistance symbolized by the two sieges of the city and military base of Sevastopol 
during the Crimean War and the Second World War (Plokhy 2000; Qualls 2009; 
Brown forthcoming 2015). 
 
Among the explanations for non-violence in Crimea, the process of elite bargaining 
and negotiations over an autonomy arrangement for Crimea have been highlighted as 
the critical factor in conflict-prevention in the 1990s (Stewart 2001; Sasse 2002 and 
2007). These lengthy negotiations over Crimea’s constitutional status from 1990-1998 
involved all the main political actors – the leaders of the regional Russian nationalist 
movement, the Crimean Tatars’ leadership, representatives of the political institutions 
in Crimea and in Kyiv, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the 
regional OSCE office in Crimea, and, in the background were bilateral discussions 
between the governments in Kyiv and Moscow over energy supplies to Ukraine and 
the Russian bases in Sevastopol. The process provided sufficient incentives for all the 
key parties to a potential conflict to remain involved in the political negotiations until 
satisfactory compromises were reached (Sasse 2007). Several structural background 
factors facilitated this political process and helped to neutralize regional Russian 
nationalist mobilization. First, after the fall of communism Russia had many external 
linkages with newly independent neighbouring states, and Western powers, but it had 
only weak leverage as a foreign policy actor. The Yeltsin leadership’s policy showed 
no obligation towards diaspora co-ethnic Russians, but rather prioritized  vital 
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strategic foreign policy and security interests, recognition by and integration with 
Western states, and good relations with the newly independent states over the interests 
of Russian diasporas (in Ukraine, the Baltic states and Kazakhstan) (Kolstø 1996; 
King and Melvin 1999; Smith 1999). Yeltsin concentrated on securing a new 
agreement with Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet bases, which militated against 
supporting Crimean Russian nationalism so long as an agreement was likely. 
Moreover, by the mid-1990s the Yeltsin leadership was absorbed by a major internal 
war against separatists in Chechnya, which severely constrained its scope for support 
for nationalist separatism in other successor states. On the contrary, as Yeltsin 
personally had been a pivotal figure in the break up of the USSR, under his leadership 
Russia became one of the most vocal advocates of recognizing the new state 
boundaries fashioned out of the USSR.  
 
Second, Russian nationalist separatism in Crimea was debilitated by the lack of clear-
cut ethno-linguistic cleavages and the unevenness of ethnopolitical mobilization in the 
region. The Russophone Slav majority in the region was composed of both ethnic 
Russians, ethnic Ukrainians and people of mixed heritage, and the ethnically 
distinctive Crimean Tatars were initially primarily Russophones, thereby creating a 
number of cross-cutting ethnic and linguistic cleavages and a baseline regional 
identity of ‘Crimeans’ (krymchane) (Sasse 2007, Appendix 2). Third, Crimea’s 
economy was strongly interlinked with Ukraine’s and the region was heavily 
dependent on Kyiv. Over 80% of Crimea’s water supply comes from Ukraine through 
the Soviet-era Dnipro canal. Crimea is also dependent on energy supplies via Kyiv, in 
particular electricity (about 90%). Ukraine as a whole, in turn, was heavily dependent 
on subsidized Russian energy resources, but the supplies were routed through 
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Ukrainian infrastructure. Peripheral regions such as Crimea were particularly badly 
affected during the economic crash after 1991, and the crisis was exacerbated in 
Crimea by the reliance of the local economy on Soviet tourism, and the Soviet 
military-industrial complex – both of which collapsed with the end of the USSR. The 
Russian nationalist movement came to power in the region at a time of socio-
economic cataclysm and was quickly seen as incompetent in addressing Crimea’s 
economic challenges, resulting in a sharp decline in public support in Crimea for 
separatism by 1996. Equally, Russia’s own economic crisis made it an unattractive 
object for unity for some in Crimea.  
 
By 1996 Russia and Ukraine were finalizing a strategic agreement on the 
Black Sea bases and desired harmonious bilateral relations. As the Crimean Russian 
separatist movement collapsed, the political negotiations intensified between the 
moderate elites of the region and the elites in Kyiv. The main function of the 
agreement on autonomy status was symbolic, although it provided some limited scope 
for the use of Russian and Crimean Tatar languages alongside Ukrainian as the state 
language, and there was a special tax regime for the region. However, Crimea did not 
manage to capitalize on these provisions for limited autonomy. The region remained a 
net recipient of transfers from the Ukrainian central budget and contributed only 
about 3% to Ukraine’s GDP, 1.4% of its exports and 3% of its tax base (Institute of 
International Finance 2014: 6). 
 
Nationalism as a power idea in Crimea was oriented towards Russia but primarily 
framed as mobilization for Crimean independence. Ultimately, the ideational linkage 
was not reciprocated by the key external actor – Russia. The overtures of the leader of 
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the Crimean Russian movement, Yurii Meshkov, to Moscow were only met with a 
lukewarm reception (Sasse 2007; Reid 2015; for interviews with Meshkov, see 
MKRU 2014 and BBC News 2014). Yeltsin and then Prime Minister Chernomyrdin 
even refused to meet him. There were some Russian politicians, most notably 
Moscow mayor Yurii Luzhkov, who backed the Crimean separatists in and beyond 
the 1990s but they had little influence on foreign policy  (see, for example, Hill 2001; 
Kyiv Post, 4 June 2010). Without the external activation of the ideational linkage by 
Russia, the focus stayed on the domestic power interactions between the pivotal 
national and regional elites. 
 
Revisiting the questions posed in the introduction to the special issue, we can 
see that the Crimean case in the 1990s demonstrates that the absence of a clear 
political opportunity structure – resulting from Russia’s state weakness and Yeltsin’s 
preference for accommodation with Ukraine and the West – limited the causal role of 
external linkages, including the power idea of nationalism, in stoking conflict in 
Crimea. External constraint allowed for the relations between domestic national and 
regional elites to remain negotiable and for an ‘institutional processing point’ – the 
discussions about autonomy – to channel the moderated external linkages to both the 
West and Russia. The result of the constitutional accommodation of the Crimean issue 
strengthened, at least temporarily, the region’s institutional links to Kyiv. The 1996 
Ukrainian constitution introduced the ‘Autonomous Republic of Crimea’ as an 
asymmetrical element in the otherwise ‘unitary’ state structure of Ukraine. The 1998 
Crimean constitution, Ukrainian legislation and a series of Constitutional Court 
decisions further refined the content of the autonomy status. The Crimean Tatars and 
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their campaign for recognition as an indigenous people further tied the peninsula 
politically to Kyiv.  
 
What had changed by 2014? 
In February 2014 Russia achieved a quick military take-over of Crimea, the 
incorporation of the region and the city of Sevastopol’ into the Russian Federation, 
and the disruption of most links between Crimea and the rest of Ukraine. This stark 
contrast between two critical episodes – 1991-96 and 2013-14 – allows us to explore 
the role of international linkages in the reopening of a conflict-issue after a critical 
period of conflict-prevention. One obvious difference between the immediate 
aftermath of the collapse of the USSR and 2013-14 is that there was a change of 
political regime in Russia, with the succession of Yeltsin by Putin. Furthermore, Putin 
set about the revival of Russia as a Great Power by a centralizing authoritarianism 
domestically - rebuilding a state “power vertical” and restoring authority and 
coherence in domestic politics – and by reasserting the primacy of more 
independently determined Russian national interests in foreign policy. Putin, in 
contrast to Yeltsin, showed a more genuine interest in the status of Russian co-ethnics 
in the “Near Abroad”, especially in the Baltic States, and a willingness to use this 
issue when convenient. 
 
Given that Russia’s military weakness was such that Russia could effectively 
only project itself as a regional power, it was with and in the newly independent states 
that Putin sought to assert Russia’s linkages and leverage. One such strategy was to 
intensify existing linkages as a way to allow for them to be turned into leverage at 
some point. Energy dependencies, trade relations and cultural linkages through the 
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Russophone populations across the Former Soviet Union provided the three main 
pillars of this linkage-leverage nexus. Since independence Ukraine had been the key 
test case for Russia to retain its predominant role in the former Soviet space. 
Ukraine’s ambivalent foreign policy hovered between closer integration with the CIS 
(Russia-led) and Western integration (with the EU and NATO). Ukraine’s 
dependence on Russian energy resources (over two thirds of Ukraine’s gas and oil 
supplies; see Woehrel 2009) and trade with Russia (about 30%; see European 
Commission 2013) gave Russia significant leverage over Ukraine to ensure that this 
strategic ambivalence was sustained.  
The 2004 ‘Orange Revolution’ sent a warning signal to Moscow that a major 
part of the Ukrainian elite aspired to a more consistently Western-oriented reform 
path, but factional and corrupt domestic Ukrainian politics stalled such reforms.  The 
election of President Yanukovych in 2010 signified a shift in power domestically to 
the Russophone south-east of Ukraine and a new tilt towards accommodation with 
Putin’s Russia compared with his predecessors. On the whole Yanukovych 
maintained the ambivalent “double vector” foreign policy of his predecessors, and he 
manouevred between Putin’s pressure for Ukraine to join the Eurasian Economic 
Union, and US and EU pressure to continue Ukraine’s European “choice” by 
negotiating on the Association Agreement and free trade area with the EU (Dragneva 
and Wolczuk eds. 2013). 
 
Throughout the 2000s voting patterns in Crimea were in line with those in 
Ukraine’s south-east (Tsentral’na Vyborcha Komisiya 1998-2012), thereby 
consolidating the perception of the Crimean issue having been resolved. Moreover, 
the strong support for President Yanukovych and his Party of the Regions in the years 
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prior to 2013 did not single out the region as a potential separatist hotspot 
(Tsentral’na Vyborcha Komisiya 2010). Russian interests in Crimea were well served 
by the combination of Yanukovych’s rule, his support for the Russian language in the 
south-east through regional laws, and no immediate uncertainty about the long-term 
arrangements for the bases in Sevastopol. Russian action in Crimea in 2014 thus came 
at a moment when the region was well integrated into Ukrainian political structures. 
The sequence for the reawakening of Russian nationalism as a power idea was the 
following: it occurred first among the Russia’s ruling elites and was subsequently re-
mobilized among Crimea’s political elites and a broad section of the regional 
population. 
The Maidan mobilization (November 2013–February 2014; for more detail see 
Onuch and Sasse forthcoming), the ouster of Yanukovych in late Feburary 2014 and 
the coming to power of an unelected interim government that was acerbic in its 
antagonism to Russia unhinged the political equilibrium on Ukraine and Crimea in 
Russian policy.  The Yanukovych regime had played a bridging role, linking regional, 
national and external (Russian) elites and subordinating external linkages to domestic 
politics. With the forced removal of Yanukovych, the external linkages with Russia 
suddenly gained in political salience and transformed into leverage. Annexing Crimea 
was a way for Putin to punish Ukraine and set limits to Western intervention. Putin 
admitted on the first anniversary of the annexation that a meticulous plan to 
orchestrate a swift military and political take-over of Crimea had long been prepared 
and its implementation decided upon when Yanukovych was ousted on 23 February 
2014 by the mass protests of the Maidan (Rossiya 1 2015; New York Times, 9 March 
2015).  
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The case of Crimea demonstrates that for external linkages to acquire causal 
significance they need to be politically mobilized. The Crimean case is instructive in 
that it captures both the more long-term process of building and maintaining linkages 
and a critical moment of mobilization. The essence of the power idea of Russian 
nationalism at the critical juncture of early 2014 was that it drew together three key 
elements and concentrated them in an emotive appeal to Russians: first, an assertion 
of Russia’s ‘historical right’ to Crimea (Sakwa 2015: 120-148; for a discussion of 
three interrelated Russian narratives about Russia’s right to Crimea, the Ukrainian far 
right and Crimea’s own drive to join Russia, see Biersack and O’Leary 2014: 252-
256); second, a consolidation of domestic popular support for the Putin regime framed 
in direct opposition to the West, including hostility to pro-West opposition within 
Russia; and third, an attempt to veto the expansion of Western linkages and potential 
leverage. Russian action was a direct attempt to set limits to the possibilities of 
Ukraine’s elites to capitalize on the opportunities provided by the pro-Western and 
EU-oriented political direction and success of the Maidan.  
 
Once the political opportunity for a sudden assertion of leverage presented 
itself, the nested linkage structure accelerated and reinforced the effect. The fact that 
about 15,000 Russian military personnel were already stationed in the region in 
connection with the leased Black Sea Fleet bases (Cecire 2014) provided a basis for a 
speedy military take-over by special troops flown in from Russia. The hastily 
arranged regional referendum in Crimea and Sevastpol (16 March 2013) on joining 
the Russian Federation officially recorded 83.1% participation and 96.8% in support 
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of joining Russia (ITAR-TASS 17 March 2014)
1
. Putin quickly empowered a 
clientelist political elite around Sergii Aksenov who was appointed Crimean prime 
minister. The official request of the Crimean government to join the Russian 
Federation, the Russian parliament’s preparation of a legislative basis for this 
territorial change to be framed as ‘legal’ and in response to Crimean demands 
(Simpson 2014; Reuters 8 March 2014), and the recognition of Crimea and 
Sevastopol as two new subjects of the Russian Federation was achieved in a matter of 
days, being confirmed in a special presidential address on 18 March 2014 (for live 
coverage, see euronews 18 March 2014). President Putin used that occasion for an 
emotive nationalistic appeal to those present and the Russian public at large to justify 
his policies against a background of claimed anti-Russian Western actions since the 
end of the Cold War. The annexation of Crimea formally signaled the start of a new 
era in Russian-Western relations, and it significantly boosted his popularity in Russia. 
 
The fact that Crimea’s linkages were overwhelmingly with Kyiv and Russia2 
also meant that once the domestic linkages had been disrupted, Russia could extend 
its own linkages to the region. From 18 March 2014 all Crimean residents were 
automatically declared Russian citizens (unless they renounced this decision within a 
one-month period). Russia’s federal Human Rights Ombudsperson, Ella Pamfilova, 
has estimated that at least 100,000 Crimeans were unable to obtain Russian 
citizenship during the first year and are now considered ‘foreigners’ (High 
Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation 2014: 95). The arrival of 
                                                        
1 These are the figures reported by the Mikhail Malyshev, the head of the referendum 
commission in Crimea on the day after the referendum, 17 March  2014. The figures 
reported as official do currently not appear on the Crimean election commission 
website.  
2
 The cultural linkage of the Crimean Tatars to Turkey, more specifically to a diffuse 
Crimean Tatar diaspora, had been somewhat more relevant politically in the 1990s. 
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an estimated 200,000 displaced people from the war zone in eastern Ukraine further 
complicates this process (ibid.)  
Crimea’s first Russia-administered census of October 2014 shows the Russian 
segment of the population increasing (from 60.4% in 2001 to 65.3%), the Ukrainian 
segment decreasing (from 24% to 15.1%) and the Crimean Tatar population higher 
than in 2001 but relatively stable compared to the immediate pre-annexation period 
(10.3% in 2001 and 12.1% in 2014) (Euromaidanpress, 16 April 2015). Out-
migration of Ukrainians and an individual re-classification by Crimeans who had 
previously identified as Ukrainians account for most of the change in the share of the 
Ukrainians, while the Russian share has been boosted by these two trends and 
possibly already the influx of refugees from the eastern regions of Ukraine. 
 
Russia’s linkages and leverage have, ironically, been strengthened by Kyiv, 
which has gradually cut its linkages in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. 
The essential water supplies through the Dnipro Canal were stopped just north of 
Crimea in March 2014, leading to serious water shortages in the region. Russia has 
put down new pipelines to channel water and dug deep wells in eastern Crimea to 
partially counter these shortages (Sputnik International 4 April 2015). Kyiv also cut 
its supplies of food, industrial products and electricity and stopped the train and bus 
services linking Crimea to the rest of Ukraine (Wall Street Journal 26 December 
2014). Estimates vary, but at the most Crimea can cover between 10-30% of its 
electricity needs through its thermal power stations, and its dependence on food and 
other delivered goods stands at about 90% (Deutsche Welle 14 March 2014, 
Euromaidanpress, 12 November 2014). Ferry links to Russian ports cannot make up 
the shortfall. Regional gas needs are said to be covered by about two-thirds from local 
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off-shore gas (and to a lesser extent oil) reserves (Deutsche Welle 14 March 2014). 
The state company Chernemorneftegaz and other state companies have been 
reregistered as Russian state companies; private companies either left or had to 
reregister under Russian law. While the effects of the sanctions on the Russian 
economy have varied by sector (Connolly, forthcoming), it is clear that US and EU 
sanctions have further isolated Crimea and its population from Ukraine and the West. 
The tourism industry in particular has been devastated. Western investors and 
companies, including Visa Inc. and Mastercard Inc., have stopped their operations in 
the region (Wall Street Journal 26 December 2014). The creation of a free economic 
zone in Crimea with tax exemptions for investors for a twenty-five year period from 1 
January 2015 is unlikely to speedily turn around the economy (pravda.ru 1 December 
2014).   
  
 
Crimea has become Russia’s most subsidized region, comparable only to the 
investment in stability and reconstruction in Chechnya and Ingushetiya. Prime 
Minister Dmitrii Medvedev himself estimated the Crimea-related costs in 2014, 
including the damage done by Western sanctions, at $27 billion (The Economist 11 
June 2015). 75-85% of Crimea’s costs have to be covered by Russia’s federal budget 
(ibid. Popov 2015). According to former Russian Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin, 
Crimea may cost Russia $6-7 billion a year, not counting the indirect costs resulting 
from capital flight (Sputnik International, 31 March 2015). Exact figures are 
impossible to give, not least because new budget commitments have been added 
incrementally, but it is estimated that the Russian budget has earmarked about 150-
200 billion rubles annually for the period 2015-2020 (Popov 2015). More specifically, 
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in October 2014 the Russian government quoted a commitment of 660 billion rubles 
for the development of energy and transport infrastructure, health care and education 
until 2020, supplemented by 50 billion rubles to plug the financial hole in the regional 
budget (The Moscow Times 30 October 2014). By 2015, the figure had been adjusted 
upwards to 736 billion rubles ($13 billion) for Crimea’s development until 2020 (Tass 
News Agency, cited in The Moscow Times 17 July 2015). The envisaged allocation for 
the road and rail bridge between Crimea and Russia across the narrow Kerch Strait is 
about $4 billion (ibid.). The Russian Energy Ministry has also signed a contract for 
$830 million for the construction of an electricity cable linking Crimea and Russia’s 
Krasnodar region by 2020.  
Crimeans depend entirely on Russia for their wage and pension payments and 
bear parts of the costs of being cut off by Ukraine. Living costs in Crimea have, for 
the most part, risen above Ukrainian levels but stay below Russian levels (with 
average wages lower than in Russia). For example, the price levels for gas and food 
are higher than elsewhere in Ukraine but lower than in Moscow, and there have been 
frequent water shortages. Despite Ukraine now charging a high price for its electricity 
supplies to Crimea, Crimeans still pay highly subsidized rates more comparable to 
Kyiv than Moscow (Kireyev 2014).  
The costs and logistical challenges associated with the take-over of Crimea are 
high, underscoring that non-economic ideological motivations, captured by the term 
“Krym nash” (“Crimea is Ours”; on krymnashizm see Popov 2015), are dominating 
decision-making. Moscow quickly broke with Putin’s early promise to accommodate 
the indigenous Crimean Tatar population. A system of repression and control has 
been applied to the Tatars. The most prominent Crimean Tatar leaders, Mustafa 
Dzhemilev and Refat Chubarov, have been banned from Crimea for five years, the 
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main political organization of the Crimean Tatars, the Mejlis, has been declared 
illegal, people have vanished or have been arrested, and demonstrations and the use of 
national symbols have been suppressed. On 31 March 2015 the Crimean Tatar TV 
station ATR was closed down – it has since reopened in Kyiv (Kyiv Post, 18 June 
2015). An estimated 10,000 Crimean Tatars have left Crimea and are now primarily 
living in Western Ukraine and Kyiv.  
 
In sum, the Crimean case highlights the particular salience of ideational 
linkages and the mechanisms of turning these into leverage. The power idea of 
Russian nationalism, this time driven by Russian elites disillusioned with integration 
into a Western dominated rule-oriented international order, and backed by a 
supportive popular mood in Russia, proved an effective means of mobilization. A 
series of political developments and linkages between Ukraine and Russia had 
prepared the ground for this to happen, but a concrete political opportunity was 
provided only by the Maidan and the regime change in Kyiv. A nationalist ideational 
linkage with Crimea that had not been reciprocated by Russia in the 1990s was 
empowered in 2014 in a manner which took that ideology to its ultimate logic of 
annexation. 
 
The Case of Chechnya: From Violent Nationalism to Coopted Islamism 
It is a perverse outcome for Russia that Chechnya, which was framed by Russian 
elites as the most serious threat posed by Islamic fundamentalism to Russia’s security 
in the early 1990s, is now informally one of the most Islamized parts of the Russian 
Federation. The puzzle in the Chechnya case is to explain how the two antithetical 
power ideas of nationalism and Islamization were in contention, and how it was that 
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Islamization triumphed.  Faced by a secular nationalist independence movement led 
by Dzhokhar Dudaev in the early to mid 1990s, Russia fought two bloody wars to 
crush this challenge. There is disagreement in the scholarly studies as to when 
Chechnya became an Islamist challenge for Russia, with some viewing this case as a 
transformation from nationalism into jihad as a consequence of radicalization induced 
by war and by the disillusionment with the Western states policy of support for 
Yeltsin and non-recognition of Chechnya’s self-determination (Hughes 2007a). 
Others, in contrast, view the case as an Islamist challenge from the outset (Hahn 
2007). Under Putin’s presidency from 2000 the policy solution devised to manage the 
Chechen insurgency was a neo-imperialist divide et impera strategy, termed 
“Chechenization”. It required the cooption of a former rebel group, the Kadyrovtsy 
clique, and then its installation as a collaborationist regime, first under its elder 
Ahmad Kadyrov until his assassination in 2004, and then under his son Ramzan 
Kadyrov, who was appointed president of Chechnya by Putin in 2007. Putin views 
Kadyrov not only as the key to stabilization in Chechnya but also as a pivotal, special, 
regional client in Russia (Russell 2008 and 2011; Souleimanov 2015). 
 
The use of “localization” or “nativization” under various guises has been a classic 
form of counterinsurgency since ancient times, and in particular for imperialist or 
imperial minded regimes. Such policies have been central to Russian, British, French 
and US efforts to occupy and control territory and crush rebellion over at least the last 
two hundred years. Generally, this policy takes two forms in practice: as part of an 
“exit” strategy, where occupiers are keen to minimize their own costs and casualties 
as they wind down a failed occupation; or as part of a long war of occupation, where 
occupiers use localization as part of a stabilization strategy, largely to heighten the 
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brutal repression of rebellion and to place their own forces at one remove from the 
day-to-day interface with and management of the conflict. In Chechnya from 2000 
Putin seems to have opted for the second strategy.  
 
As a consequence of “Chechenization”, Putin accepted what has been termed 
“separatism without secession” – a higher degree of self-rule for Chechnya than any 
other Russian federal subject, and of a kind that sets it de facto outside the Russian 
constitutional order in a kind of “dual state” (Sakwa 2010). There is a tendency 
among some analysts, both inside and outside Russia, to flippantly deride the 
Kadyrov regime as a corrupt and erratic tin-pot dictatorship, but this view confuses 
Kadyrov’s obvious crude personal propensities of taste with the objective political 
outcomes of his navigation of patron-clientelism under Putin. In fact, Kadyrov has 
been an astute political and military leader of Chechnya, extracting concessions from 
Russia in terms of latitude of self-rule, and economic support for reconstruction and 
social welfare, and tolerance of illegality that seemed impossible at the start of the 
second war in 1999-2000. Putin has supported his client Kadyrov with uncritical 
backing throughout a number of scandals, including numerous assassinations of 
critics of Kadyrov, or Putin, or both, which are often attributed to Kadyrov loyalists, 
but most important has been the enormous budgetary transfers, and no doubt also a 
great deal of off-budget funding, to build linkages and leverage between the two 
leaders. The disproportionality of the transfers has generated much grumbling at elite 
and popular levels in Russia about the “feeding” (kormlenie) of Kadyrov and 
corruption in the Caucasus. These complaints, however, are less concerned with the 
concept of administrative feeding per se, but rather with what is perceived as Putin’s 
privileging of Kadyrov and the North Caucasus. Putin, however, has not allowed the 
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criticisms to deflect him from the policy of investing in Kadyrov. Moreover, it has 
been argued that both have employed corruption productively, at least in the short 
term, as a social “glue” to rebind the Chechen society broken by a decade of war and 
to enhance Kadyrov’s authority (Zabyelina 2013).  
 
Corruption around state funding in Chechnya predates the consolidation of 
power by Kadyrov. The chief accountant of the Audit Chamber, Sergei Ryabukhin, 
found that almost $700 million in budget monies in 2003, and about $600 million in 
2004, were lost in “financial violations” in Chechnya (Ryabukhin 2005). From 2002 
to 2006, the Russian government allocated 30.6 billion roubles (then about US$916 
million) to Chechnya within the federal programme for the republic’s restoration. The 
corruption in this period was undoubtedly perpetrated in the main by Russian 
ministries and state agencies. This development funding approximates to the roughly 
one billion per year that Russia was spending on the war in Chechnya. According to 
the Russian Federation’s Chamber of Accounts, the North Caucasus Federal District 
received 167.8 billion rubles (then US$5.4 billion) in 2010 and 270 billion rubles 
(then US$8.6 billion) in 2011. In December 2012, the Kremlin approved the State 
Development Program for the North Caucasus through to 2025, and a law passed in 
April 2014 allocated about 204.7 billion rubles (then about US$ 5.68 billion) to the 
North Caucasus region and stipulating that the funds be spent by 2020 (for these 
figures see Razvitie Zevero-Kavkazskogo Federal’nogo Okruga, 2014; Zabyelina, 
2013: 42 [she has confused milliard with trillion, has somewhat different figures and 
her conversions are at March 2013 rates]).  
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The scale of destruction in Chechnya required an immense reconstruction effort. By 
2002 the war had turned one third of Chechnya’s population (about 300,000 persons) 
into internally displaced persons. Not one of Grozny’s 4,664 apartment blocks was 
intact in that year, and some 32,000 private houses were badly damaged or destroyed. 
Health and ecological problems, particularly concerning mental health, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, tuberculosis, and water pollution remain major problems. From 2001 
to 2014 about $14 billion was spent on federally funded reconstruction mostly 
through “targeted” special programmes like that mentioned above (International 
Crisis Group 2015). For example, in 2010, the year after Russia ended its military 
operations in Chechnya, the federal budget allocation for Chechnya, with an official 
population of just over 1.2 million (a vast overestimation by most accounts), was 
some $1.8 billion ($1500 per person). Dagestan, with its official population of 2.7 
million, received less than $1.6 billion ($593 per person); Kabardino-Balkaria, with a 
population of 890,000, received $650 million ($730 per person); and North Ossetia, 
with a population of 700,000, received $400 million ($571 per person). Chechnya has 
continued to be by far the most fiscally privileged of the North Caucasus republics, 
partly because its socio-economic problems are widely seen as being of an order of 
magnitude worse than its neighbours, but also because of the close patron-client ties 
between Putin and Kadyrov, and the rewarding of Kadyrov’s control of the 
insurgency. Fiscal transfers are an essential component of security containment and 
control, since they provide leverage for Kadyrov to build authority, for example by 
the expansion of security forces. This has allowed him to coopt former fighters and 
provide alternative lifestyle pathways for young people who might otherwise have 
been drawn into jihad. Russia is following a long established pathway in 
counterinsurgency of contaminating a developmental logic with a control logic, and 
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thus corruption and weaknesses in the effective delivery of social programmes and 
reconstruction have mattered less than a securitized vision of “stability”. 
 In return, Kadyrov has devastatingly crushed the Islamist resistance in the 
most brutal and thorough manner. Russia, with some justification, declared its 
“counterterrorism operation” in Chechnya complete by 2009, and insurgent violence 
has become residual. Kadyrov achieved this feat largely by a shrewd combination of 
carrot and stick policies, including a wide scale amnesty for rebels in 2003-06 and the 
paying of veteran’s pensions and the provision of employment opportunities in his 
own security forces, plus a deterrence policy of  terrorizing the families and social 
networks of known rebels through collective responsibility and publicly 
demonstrative deterrent punishments. The Russian federal government has come to 
this astute combination of developmental logics, if skewed by corruption and 
counterinsurgency, belatedly because this policy required a credible partner from the 
Chechen resistance. The cooption of the Kadyrovtsy made the “Chechenization” 
strategy viable. As we shall discuss below, the result of this policy has been the de 
facto Islamization of Chechnya on a scale not tolerated in any other Muslim area of 
Russia.   
 
The Nationalist Phase 
The nationalization mobilization for independence in Chechnya in the 1980s/90s was 
part of the wider nationalist tide that was unleashed by Gorbachev’s reforms and 
loosening of authoritarian controls. The combination of nationalist mobilization and 
democratic reforms undermined elite integration, forcing elites to abandon unpopular 
Soviet communism for the new power idea of nationalism (Beissinger 2002). In 
Central and Eastern Europe, the mobilization process by which the nationalism power 
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idea took hold and became hegemonic was generally viewed more favourably in the 
West compared with those in the USSR. This variable normative conception of how 
to manage the end of communism among the Western alliance states was most 
evident in the policy approach for managing the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia 
beginning in 1991. The reinvented international norm of uti posseditis iuris 
established that only the next highest administrative entities in both the USSR and 
Yugoslavia would be recognized as new states. Although this norm was later 
abandoned by the Western Alliance in the case of Kosovo in 2007, its application in 
the 1990s in effect blocked national self-determination for entities like Chechnya that 
did not have the required administrative status at the moment of break up. The irony 
is that the spirit of the concept of uti posseditis iuris was a much better fit for a place 
like Chechnya, which had been the subject of imperial conquest by the Russian 
Empire, had been colonized extensively by Slav settlers under the Soviet Union, and 
its Chechen inhabitants had suffered acts of genocide under Soviet rule during and 
after the deportation of 1944-5 (see Dunlop 1998).  
In this early phase of the development of the nationalist power idea during the 
collapse of communism, Chechnya was rendered into a case of trapped nationalism by 
the bi-fold approach of the Western states to recognition. Firstly, the effect of 
European Community states’s efforts to manage the disintegration of Yugoslavia was 
to actually preempt its collapse, with Opinion One of the Badinter Arbitration 
Committee being legally critical in this respect (Radan 1997). Secondly, the Western 
states accepted more or less without question the form of dissolution of the USSR 
enacted by Soviet era elites in the Belovezha Accord and Alma Aty Agreement of 
December 1991, with official recognitions following quickly. 
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Why was the nationalism power idea sustained for some years by the 
leadership of former Soviet general Dudaev that came to power in Chechnya in 
summer and autumn of 1991, despite the potential for a successful recognition being 
blocked regionally and internationally? Other nationalist elites in the Russian 
Federation, notably that of Tatarstan, ultimately chose to compromise with Moscow 
on their nationalist vision in return for greater economic and cultural self government. 
Even Chechnya’s neighbouring and ethnically similar Republic of Ingushetia, also led 
at that time by a former Soviet General (Ruslan Aushev) rejected separatism and 
chose compromise with the Yeltsin leadership. Why was Chechnya distinct in its 
uncompromising position on self-determination, compared with other potential cases 
of conflict in the Russian Federation?  
 
The most convincing explanation suggests that a combination of structural, 
cultural and personalistic factors produced this outcome. The structural elements 
included: Chechnya was ethnically homogenized by 1992 through the ethnic 
cleansing or flight of Slav settlers; Chechnya had sufficient oil reserves to provide 
economic independence; it was located on Russia’s new international frontier and its 
dominant geography of mountain forest would facilitate resistance; Chechen-Russian 
relations were characterized by the legacy of colonialism and racial stereotypes which 
militated against negotiation and compromise; there were antipathetic interpersonal 
relations between Yeltsin and Dudaev. The latter is probably best accounted for by 
two factors – firstly, the fact that while Yeltsin was a product of the Soviet party 
nomenklatura, with all of its corrupt interpersonal ties, Dudaev appears to have been 
someone who rose through the professional ranks in the military as a result of talent; 
and secondly, Yeltsin was an alcoholic who favoured decision-making during 
 28 
drinking binges, whereas Dudaev was teetotal and valued personal discipline. Dudaev 
and his associates were also particularly influenced by the form of nationalism that 
led up to independence for the three Baltic republics of the USSR, and he saw them as 
a model for Chechnya. Lastly, Chechnya’s capacity to resist Russia was significantly 
enhanced by the seizure of weapons and war material from Russian stockpiles near 
Grozny (Hughes 2007a). 
 
The Islamist Phase 
In recent years there have been a growing number of scholarly studies which 
locate the Chechnya case within broader literatures on terrorism, insurgency and 
jihad. In particular there have been studies of the dynamics of insurgent and 
counterinsurgent violence (Kramer 2004-05; Hughes 2007b; Lyall 2009), studies of 
nationalist and Islamist rebel motivations (Janeczko 2014; Toft and Zhukov 2015), 
and studies of the role of indigenous forces in support of counterinsurgents 
(Souleimanov and Huseyn 2014), and studies of jihadi linkages between Chechen 
fighters and Al Qaeda (Sagramoso 2012). The main inferences drawn from these 
studies concern the nature and effectiveness of insurgent and counterinsurgent tactics.  
This is a genre that reflects the fact that the conflict in Chechnya has increasingly 
been framed as part of the wider Islamist global insurgency driven by Al Qaeda, and 
more lately by ISIS, and research is being led by a need to offer lessons for 
counterinsurgents (principally the USA) in its struggles elsewhere. However, such 
narrowly focused approaches that are driven by policy concerns with success in 
counterinsurgency, fail to address, let alone explain, the meta-level shift in the 
ideational basis for this conflict, from the leverage of one power idea to another, from 
nationalism to Islamic jihad.  
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We suggest that there is a conjuncture of three main push and pull explanatory 
drivers for this transformation. First, a key push factor was that it became clear during 
the process of fighting the first Russo-Chechen War in 1994-6, and in the immediate 
years following the democratic election of Aslan Maskhadov as Chechen president in 
1997, that the national self-determination option for Chechnya was blocked, not only 
by Russia but by Western states. The USA and main EU powers prioritized good 
relations with Russia in this period, limited their interventions in the Chechnya case to 
inconsistent expressions of concern about the human rights dimension, and rigidly 
adhered for these political reasons to the policy of non-recognition of Chechnya’s 
secession (for example, see Lapidus 1998). Second, there is a question as to whether 
disenchantment with secular nationalism in Chechnya was a top-down, bottom-up, or 
some process of interaction of the two. The evidence is sparse as there has been no 
large scale interviewing of Chechen insurgents. A reasonable assumption is that 
radicalization was also intensified by the personal  lived experiences and common 
mutual brutalizing effects of war on the Chechen elites and masses, especially the 
fighters and their families. Russia and Chechen forces fought the wars as sectarian 
and race wars, largely abandoning the laws and norms of war and using violence 
indiscriminately and with extreme disproportionality (Gilligan 2009). Russian forces 
were by far the worst offender in this regard. A small number of spectacular terrorist 
acts against Russian civilians perpetrated by forces within the broad Chechen 
resistance coalition facilitated the demonization of Chechen resistance as “terrorists” 
by the Russian state, and fuelled the sectarianism and racism of Russia’s military and 
security forces, as well as repugnance at Chechen “terrorism” internationally. It was 
the most Islamized section of the Chechen resistance under Shamil Basaev that led the 
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way in this kind of shock terror acts against Russian civilian targets (predating 
indiscriminate attacks by Al Qaeda). The bulk of the insurgent violence, however, fell 
within the laws and norms of war (Hughes, 2007b). 
 We should note that the demonization by Russia of the Chechen resistance as 
“Islamist” was an instrumentalized frame that started even in the autumn of 1991, 
before large scale violent conflict and several years prior to the actual process of 
Islamisation. The pervasive sectarian violence also intensified over time, as Russian 
war crimes in the first war were taken to a new extreme in the second Russo-Chechen 
war from late 1999, inducing reciprocal extremes of violence from the Chechen side.  
Attributing radicalization to the lived experience of conflict has its explanatory limits, 
since studies of the nature of violence in this conflict cited earlier tend to support the 
theory that the insurgency has been contained and deradicalized in Chechnya by the 
cooption of indigenous proxies who are even more brutal than the Russian forces. 
This containment in Chechnya is also part of the explanation for the diffusion of jihad 
to other parts of the North Caucasus. Paradoxically, it seems that extreme violence 
can radicalize and also deradicalize. 
 Third, the waning of nationalism as a power idea among the Chechen 
resistance was strongly affected by the pull of the alternative power idea of Islamic 
jihad.  We should distinguish the leverage of jihadism from the growing religiosity, 
even if formal, within Chechen society after the fall of communism, which was a 
common trend across many religious groups in the former USSR. It is argued that an 
Islamist versus “moderates” cleavage developed within the broad Chechen separatist 
movement during the 1990s (Wilhelmsen 2005). However, the process of 
Islamization of the separatists in Chechnya was occurring sequentially unevenly, at 
least at the level of political and military leaders that is traceable rhetorically, and 
 31 
from what we know of personal behavior. But, it was also a general trend that covered 
all of the key leaders in the 1990s. There is evidence of a steady Islamist 
radicalization of key leaders such as Dudaev, Maskhadov, Yandarbiev and Basaev, 
and that process can be traced through their public, and where reported, their private 
statements (see for example, the systematic study of the case of Yandarbiev in 
Hughes 2010). It was also occurring prior to the outbreak of the first Russo-Chechen 
war in December 1994.  
 
The leverage of Islamic jihad on the Chechen resistance was the result of a 
radicalized opportunity structure internationally in the early to mid-1990s that created 
an opening for a new power idea. There was a new-found salience of the Salafist 
variant of Islamic jihad arising from the emergence and  growth of Al Qaeda, 
following its foundation in 1988 in Afghanistan by Osama Bin Laden and others 
among the mainly Arab international contingent of fighters that had fought with the 
mujahideen against the Soviet forces and their indigenous proxies.  The growth of Al 
Qaeda was contemporaneous with a number of violent conflicts involving clashes 
often between nominally Muslim and non-Muslim peoples including Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Palestine, Kashmir, and Chechnya, among others. Osama Bin Laden, 
from his fatwa on jihad in 1996, reached out to embrace struggles like that in 
Chechnya, which were characterized by sectarian conflict, and which he portrayed as 
“massacres” of Muslims (Osama Bin Laden 1996). Furthermore, in addition to 
propagandistic support for the struggle in Chechnya, Al Qaeda provided from 1995 
some small-scale direct support by sending experienced fighters and financial support 
to the Chechen resistance. The exact scale of the financial support is not known, and 
is usually exaggerated by Russian sources, but was unlikely to have been significant 
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overall, and the number of foreign fighters was likely to have been more in the range 
of the many dozens than hundreds. The pull factor in the leverage of Islamic jihad 
came from its form as a newly emergent power idea that was gaining traction as a 
moral and ideological force in a number of conflicts involving Muslims globally. This 
interaction was also partly mutual, as the key leader in the Islamisation of the 
Chechen resistance, Shamil Basaev, led a few dozen Chechen fighters to Al Qaeda’s 
base in Khost in Afghanistan in summer 1994 for military and ideological training. Al 
Qaeda’s promotion of a global “awakening” (as Bin Laden put it) of Muslims for 
jihad corresponded temporally with disenchantment in Chechnya with secular 
nationalism.  
 As a Muslim identity took hold during the conflict, Russian policy reinforced 
this process by the propagandistic demonization and othering of Chechens as a group, 
as well as by the brutal military practices of its counterinsurgent forces on the ground. 
The attraction of jihadism was also enhanced by the inspirational fighting capability, 
determination and relative effectiveness of the Islamic jihad element in the resistance, 
most notoriously in that group of fighters led by Basaev (including the foreign 
fighters). We should also not discount a jihadi chic element, as the resistance 
borrowed rhetoric, totems and fashion from jihad historically, and from other 
contemporary struggles. The jihadis were also very proficient propagandists and used 
the internet to tap into international networks to promote understanding of their cause 
and highlight their successful military actions, and to locate the Chechen struggle 
within a broader repertoire of jihad globally. Even before his assassination by Russia 
in 1996, Dudaev, and other leaders such as Yandarbiev, had tilted away from 
nationalism toward a Chechen jihad as a mobilizing device for the struggle. By the 
latter 1990s, much of the resistance in Chechnya was operating within a jihadist 
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paradigm. During the second war Maskhadov and Basaev cooperated closely as a 
duumvirate in leading the resistance, and while they had tactical differences over the 
use of terrorist acts against civilians, there was a growing unity within the Chechen 
resistance after 2000 around Islamisation, and understanding the conflict in a 
sectarian frame. Indeed, prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Russian-
Chechen conflict exhibited many of the features of non-discrimination and 
disproportionality in the use of violence that have subsequently been associated with 
both sides in the US-led wars with Al Qaeda. 
 
It is a paradox of this conflict in terms of linkage and leverage that not only 
did the Chechen struggle transmogrify from nationalism to jihad but that the Russian 
policy devised under Putin to deal with the resistance had the consequence, perhaps 
unforeseen, of strengthening the Islamization of Chechnya. The Kadyrovtsy had a 
strong Islamic ethos in the sense that the head of the clique, Ahmad Kadyrov, was a 
religious leader. His son, Ramzan Kadyrov, first as prime minister and then president 
of Chechnya was given a free rein by Putin to use the most barbarous methods to 
crush the resistance, while also being indulged in a pseudo-Islamisation of Chechnya. 
From 2007 a partial Sharia legal system has developed and de facto has displaced the 
Russian Constitution in Chechnya, with Islamic dress codes, polygamy, “honour 
killings” of women, restrictions on alcohol and other aspects of Sharia openly 
imposed by religious courts and supported by Kadyrov.  To demonstrate his Muslim 
credentials Kadyrov has built the largest mosque in Russia in Grozny, and he 
organized in Grozny in January 2015one of the largest protests in the Muslim world 
against the Charlie Hebdo cartoons.. For some commentators, Kadyrov’s Chechnya is 
all but an “Islamic state” within Russia (Khodarkovsky 2015).  
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The successful counterinsurgency  in Chechnya, together with the extra-
territorial nature of the jihadi goal of establishing a Caliphate, has led to the spread of 
jihadist violence outside Chechnya and across the North Caucasus region. There has 
been a  meta-level conceptual shift from political identification with particular 
national territories and groups, to a  transnational sectarian concern with the “Muslim 
community”, This process predated the Chechen-Al Qaeda linkages, as evidenced in 
Basaev’s leadership of a Chechen “battalion” on the Abkhaz side during the war with 
Georgia in 1994. Over time, however, the form of Islamic jihadist ideology within the 
resistance in Chechnya became more global than locally rooted. It has become more 
externally influenced and more integrated with the wider international jihadist 
movement that has developed around Al Qaeda and more recently ISIS in Syria and 
Iraq. 
 
Conclusion 
Our analysis shows that what we have termed “power ideas” – fundamental 
ideas about how political power should be arranged - are particularly salient linkages 
at moments of crisis framed by external and domestic actors as critical junctures. 
These linkages can be instrumentalized to generate ideological leverage to change 
conflict dynamics. Both the Chechnya and Crimea cases highlight the political 
salience of power ideas shaping conflict dynamics. In both cases ideas and their 
instrumentalization by political leaderships have been pivotal to conflict outcomes. In 
the case of Crimea, Russia’s initial policy was to deter Crimean Russian nationalism 
in the 1990s in favour of good bilateral relations with a Ukrainian state whose foreign 
policy zig-zagged between Russia and the West. By late 2013 Russian policy was 
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reconfigured to mobilize this same nationalism, leading to the annexation of Crimea 
in early 2014. Neither the linkage of the power idea nor a range of other Russia-
oriented economic and cultural linkages, had changed. The main difference was a 
leadership change in Russia, from Yeltsin to Putin, and by 2013 Putin had abandoned 
Yeltsin’s pretensions of integration with Western states around a rule-oriented 
international order in preference for a Russian nationalist inspired vision of Russia as 
a Great Power. The domestic political conditions in Ukraine - the Maidan protests and 
the resulting regime change in Kyiv, together with the pro-Western tilt of the new 
Ukrainian government ,– triggered Putin into instrumentalizing the power idea of 
nationalism in Crimea. Crimea is a case of revitalizing and capitalizing on existing 
linkages, turning them into ideational leverage at a critical juncture framed as part of a 
nationalist narrative around “Krym nash”.  
In the case of Chechnya, the puzzle is to explain the shift in the ideational 
logics of this conflict. For Chechen leaders the operationalization and then 
abandonment of the nationalism power idea for the ideology of Islamic jihad can be 
attributed to disillusionment with the West, as well as the growing pull of Al Qaeda 
internationally in the 1990s. In this case also, the conflict dynamics were a structuring 
device on the conflict itself, as the sectarian nature of the Russo-Chechen wars 
strengthened the linkages and leverage of sectarian identification. The paradox in this 
case, is that Russia framed its conflict in Chechnya almost from the very outset as a 
struggle against the “Islamic threat”, yet from 2001 Putin’s strategy of cooption of the 
Kadyrovtsy and “Chechenization” has resulted in a thorough Islamization of 
Chechnya.     
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Some external linkages just exist as part of geography or historical legacies; 
others are actively built over time or deepened by conflict dynamics. But not all 
linkages have leverage properties. In this article we have examined two power ideas 
that do have such properties and can – but do not have to - be turned into leverage by 
political opportunities and choices. Both their activation and de-activation by pivotal 
internal and external actors transforms the conflict dynamics. Our argument about the 
causal force of ideational linkages invites future research into other conflicts to take 
the role of external linkages in general and the role of ideas in conflict dynamics in 
particular more seriously.  
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